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RIGHT TO COUNSEL - POLICE DUTY TO PRESERVE 
SUSPECT'S RIGHTS 
Regina v. VERJfANNINGlr - Supreme Court of Canada 
#18505, June 1987 
A couple of days after a store employee was the victim of an--armed robbery, 
the police, acting on a tip, attended at a certain location where the accused 
arrived a short time later in a car which was reported stolen. Under the seat 
of the car a handgun was found. The accused was arrested for the robbery, as 
well as the theft and possession of the car. All his rights were read to him 
at the time. When asked if he understood, he commented: •It sounds like an 
American T.V. programme.• This caused a second reading of the rights which 
resulted in the response: •Prove it. I ain't saying anything until I see my 
lawyer. I want to see my lawyer.• This exchange was followed by: 
Q. •What's your name?• 
A. •Ronald Charles Manninen• 
Q. •What's your address?• 
A. •Ain't got one• 
Q. •lJhere's the knife that you had along with this (gun) when 
you ripped off the Mac's Hilk on Wilson Street?• 
A. •He's lying. When I was in the store I only had the gun. The 
knife was in the toolbox in the car.• 
A search of the stolen car resulted in police finding two knives and clothing 
similar to what the robber wore at the time of the robbery. There was a 
conversation in respect to these items: 
Q. •lJhat are these for?• (showing him the knives) 
A. •lJhat the fuck do you think they are for? Are you 
stupid?• 
Q. •You tell me what they are for,_ and is this (a sweater) yours?• 
A. •of course it's mine. You fuckers are really stupid. Don't 
bother me anymore. I'm not saying anything until I see my 
lawyer. Just fuck off. You fuckers have to prove it.• 
·The accused was convicted, but acquitted on appeal. The Crown took the matter 
to the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of the admissibility of the above 
utterances by the accused. The statements bad been weighty in the trial 
judge's consideration and they had been centre-stage in the Ontario Court of 
Appeal which found that the statements were the direct results of the 
infringement of the accused's rights to counsel and ought to have been 
excluded. The arrest and conversation with the accuse.d took place in an 
office with a telephone at hand. Despite the accused's assertion of •1 ain't 
saying anything until I see my lawyer•, the questioning had continued and 
* See Volume 17, page 7 of this publication 
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resulted in this inculpatory statement. Though the accused may not have been 
eloquent, there could be no doubt what he intended to convey. He had been 
arrested at 2:45 p.m. but did not get to speak to his lawyer until "the lawyer 
phoned him at the police station at 8:35 p.m.• 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter and common law imposes two 
duties on police in addition to having to make a detainee aware of his right 
to counsel, that is (1) to provide a reasonable opportunity to exercise that 
right, and (2) to cease questioning or otherwise attempting to solicit 
evidence from the detainee until he has had a reasonable opportunity to retain 
and instruct counsel." In respect to the reasonable opportunity in this case 
scenario, the court found that, where a telephone is available at an earlier 
occasion, there is no justification to wait until arrival at the police 
station. This includes that upon the assertion, as in this case, the detainee 
need not ask for the use of a phone. Police control him and they must provide 
him with the opportunity to contact counsel. 
The Court hastened to add that there may be •circwnstances" (see wording of s. 
24(2) of the Charter) where urgency dictates to continue an investigation 
before it is possible to accommodate a detainee in this regard. 
Said the Court about the intent of s. lO{b) of the Charter: 
"The purpose of the right to counsel is to allow the 
detainee not only to be informed of his rights and 
obligations under the law, but equally, if not more 
important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise 
those rights.• 
The Court dismissed the notion that the accused continuing to answer questions 
after his explicit assertion had amounted to an implicit waiver of his right 
to retain and instruct counsel. Two innocuous questions had been followed by 
a baiting question which resulted in an inculpatory statement. An explicit 
assertion of a right that is not followed up by police providing a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise that right (but by further questions) cannot result in 
. an implicit waiver.* Standards of such waivers are very high warned the 
Court. 
The final question ·to be determined was whether the statement's admission in 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Firstly, 
the infringement of the accused's rights was "very serious". He had clearly 
stated he did wish to remain silent and police officers sworn to protect this 
right failed to perform their duty in not giving the detainee a reasonable 
* See Clark.son v. The Queen, Vol . 24, Page 38 of this publication. 
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opportunity to contact his lawyer. Furthermore, the evidence was self-
incriminatory. It was not real evidence that already existed but was evidence 
that was the fruit of the officers ignoring the right to counsel. Although 
the alleged offence was one of considerable gravity, admission of the 
statement would, due to the seriousness of the rights infringement, bring 
disrepute on the administration of justice and render the trial-.-11nfair. 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Order for new trial upheld. 
Comment: At a very recent national Criminal Law Conference, attended 
predominantly by defence counsel with a mixture of judges and Crown attorneys, 
this decision was quite thoroughly discussed and applauded by the defence 
side. It was generally agreed that the case sets a precedent for an included 
right (included in right to counsel) not to be asked questions unless there is 
an explicit waiver of that right. The only exception to this is when the 
suspect begins to speak on his own without being prompted or being asked 
anything that has a causal link to a self-incriminating answer. 
** * * * * 
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OPENING OF PACKET CONTAINING DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING 
APPLICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO INTERCEPT PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS 
Although it has been quiet at the·"open the packet" front for some time, there 
is recently considerable movement in this area of law. The provisions of s. 
178 .14 of the Criminal Code are still in effect, but the~~ seems to be 
overriding considerations arising from the Charter of Rights-· and Freedom. 
These considerations cause packets to be opened to determine the admissibility 
of wire-tap evidence. The packet can be opened for cause if the applicant 
shows that the applying authorities did mislead or failed to disclose in 
regard to the affidavit/application. This, of course, creates a dilemma in 
that the defence has no way of knowing what information was attested to, to 
obtain the authorization. This, and in some cases, other information 
contained in the packet are essential to the defence to prepare a proper 
defence to what is alleged. With the exception of B.C. most judicial 
jurisdictions in Canada now grant the opening of the packet as of right where 
the Crown leads direct or indirect evidence of intercepted private 
communications. That means that the defence needs not show any improprieties 
in terms of the Crown's disclosures to the authorizing judge at the time of 
application. This has raised all kinds of complications for the Crown and its 
duty to protect the identity of informers and undercover personnel primarily, 
and secondly, police operations. To accommodate the Crown in this duty, 
editing procedures ex parte in camera and open court processes are being 
devised by innovative legal minds. In the last few months there have been 
many cases on this point, and the law in this area is so rapidly developing 
that writing synopses of these cases is superfluous until the law is settled. 
Due to a decision by the B.C. Supreme Court in December of 1986* our province 
maintains a status quo for now. In other words, in B.C. the packets are not 
opened as of right--yet. However, it is popularly predicted that this bastion 
will have to capitulate as soon as this issue reaches the Supreme Court of 
Canada (again).** 
In the meantime, this blurp is merely an •amber light" for B.C. law 
enforcement authorities, that relying on the confidentiality of the packet may 
be the equivalent of feeling safe and secure on the Titanic. 
* A.C. Canada v. Wetmore, Vancouver Registry C.C. 861795 
** Wilson v. The Queen, (1983] 9 C.C.C. (3d.) 97 
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UNEXPIA.IRED 19 KlNUTES DEi.AT IR TAllBG FD.ST 
SAMPLE OF BRF.A.m KF.ANING OF •AS SOON AS PRAC'flCA.BLE• 
Regina v. HD/SON - County Court of Yale 
Kelowna 86/51, April 1987 
A demand had been made for samples of t:he accused's breath. All went in 
timely succession and without delay until the investigating officer turned the 
accused over to the breathalyzer operator. According to the evidence before 
the trial judge the 19 minutes between handing the accused over to the 
operator and the first sample being taken remained unexplained. The trial 
judge had applied the precedents in regards to the meaning of the statutory 
requirement that the samples be taken as soon as practicable before the 
resulting analyses have any evidentiary value in determining the blood-alcohol 
level at the time of driving. The Courts have generally held that* as soon as 
practicable does not mean as soon as possible and that every minute need not 
be accounted for. Even an unexplained gap of 30 minutes may not necessarily 
mean that the samples were not taken as expeditedly as statute demands. 
Consequently, the accused was convicted ;and became an appellant. 
The appellant argued that the latitude applied in the leading cases no longer 
applies due to a decision by the B.C. Court of Appeal in 1984.** This Court 
of Appeal, in a wiretap issue, held that statuto:r:y requisite conditions must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By not explaining the 19 minute gap, the 
Crown had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the samples of breath 
were taken as soon as practicable, argued the appellant. After all, that 
samples must be taken expeditedly, is a •statutory condition precedent•. 
The County Court Judge rejected the arguments by defence counsel and held that 
there was no analogy between the Privacy Act case he relied on and this 
breathalyzer case. The requisite constitution for intercepting private 
communication in the case decided by the B.C. Court of Appeal, was whether the 
accused in that case •resorted• to the place. In other words, defence counsel 
asked to equate in terms of strictness, the word •resort• and the words •as 
soon as practicable•. The word •resort• demands, in semantics alone, a much 
broader interpretation and far more interpretive latitude. Furthermore, where 
· the provisions of s. 178.13 C.C. makes proof that a person resorts to a 
certain place a •statutory condition precedent•, the court held that: 
* R. v. Hay, Volume 30, Page 6; R. v. Ulrich and R. v. lfacEacheron, 
Volume 9. Page 10; R. v. Pearce, Volume 12, page 25; R. v. Cambrin 
** R. v. lf111er, [1984] 12 C.C.C. (3d) 54 
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" the words 'as soon as practicable' in s. 
24l(l)(c) involves presumptive proof, in absence 
of the evidence to the contrary." 
The Court stressed unexplained delays must not be too long and held that a 19 
minute gap was still acceptable. However, it warned that unacceptable gaps in 
terms of duration, must have a rational foundation and require evidence to be 
adduced so the Court can judge whether the delay brings the taking of the 
samples outside the conditions the law sets. 
Accused Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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CRIMINAL •HIT AND RUN• - INTENT - KNOVLEDGE 
Regina v. HENRY - County Court of Yale 
Vernon Registry 16120, Kay 1987 
Tile accused struck a pedestrian with her car. The pedestrian_~ad moved very 
quickly, and according to eyewitnesses, the collision was unavoidable. The 
accused failed to stop; the pedestrian died from the injuries sustained. nie 
accused was arrested 30 hours after the accident and she gave a statement how 
she remembers her car had bounced violently, but she had assumed she had ran 
over a dog. She had made no attempt to discover the cause of the bouncing. 
The trial Judge found that the Crown must prove that the accused knew she had 
collided with a person and not merely that she ought to have known, or if a 
reasonable person would have known in the circumstances that there had been 
such a collision. Only the actual knowledge of having struck a person 
obligated the accused to stop and fulfill all the other obligations contained 
in s. 236 C. C. The Crown had failed to prove such knowledge beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the accused was acquitted. This verdict was appealed by 
the Crown, which submitted: 
" ... ·the gist of the offence, in terms of !!lfill!. 
l:tl, is the leaving without stopping when an 
accident of any sort has occurred, and in this 
issue, the concern with what or with whom the 
vehicle contact has been ~ade is irrelevant.• 
nie Crown supported its submission by saying that only when a person, after 
stopping in such circumstances, discovers the collision is with any one of the 
things mentioned in s. 236 C.C. is there an obligation to remain and do all of 
the things the section dictates. In this case, there was a deliberate 
ignorance on the part of the accused (if she was to be believed) and if the 
case stands "wilful blindness" would be an escape for any driver in 
circumstances where not only common sense, but also the law dictates that 
he/she stops. Furthermore, the Crown had proved the "actus reus" (the 
wrongful act) as a fact. Due to. the rational connection between that fact and 
the presumption that she failed to stop in order to escape civil or criminal 
liability, the onus is placed on the accused to disprove that there was the 
requisite mens rea. 
Taking in consideration that it was dark and raining and that, according to an 
expert, the pedestrian had not collided with the front or side of the car, but 
with the "underneath" of the vehicle, the appeal court could not hold that the 
trial judge was wrong in finding that the accused had the requisite knowledge 
to form mens rea. Despite the fact that the accused assumed she had collided 
with something, section 236 does not oblige her to stop unless she knows she 
had collided with "a vehicle, a person or cattle in the charge of a person.• 
Such knowledge only will trigger the presumption that the failure to stop was 
the escape from liability, the graveman of the offence created by the Hit and 
Run section. 
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IS A PISTOL MINUS THE MAGAZINE A FIREARM? 
Regina v. Jlatkins and Graber - B •. C. Court of Appeal 
CA 005703 and CA 005767, Vancouver - January, 1987 
The accused were convicted of robbing a credit union and of _!l~ing a firearm 
while committing this crime. The alleged firearm was a 9 mm ~rowning pistol 
which takes a magazine with ammunition in the grip. Without the insertion of 
this magazine the pistol is not functional as the trigger mechanism is 
immobilized. When the gun was found in the accused's possession, the magazine 
was missing; there was no ammo found and the hammer was cocked. 
The accused appealed the convictions for robbery on several grounds in regards 
to identification, and also the use of a firearm on the basis that what they 
had in their possession was not a firearm in accordance with the definition 
contained in s. 82(1) C.C. 
A similar case was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1983* where the 
robbers had used a C02 pistol of which seven parts were missing. These parts 
were each essential· to make the pistol functional. The Court recognized that 
an incomplete firearm, that cannot be made functional at the scene of a crime, 
is not necessarily a firearm as it was intended by Parliament when it enacted 
s. 82(1) C.C. It is generally understood that robbers who attack a financial 
institution during business hours, will make every attempt to minimize the 
duration of the robbery. To say that an incomplete firearm used during such a 
crime fits into the firearm definition, would be as absurd as excluding it 
from that definition if it is used in a crime as, for instance, unlawful 
confinement that extends over hours or days where a simple adaptation would 
make that same gun a functional firearm. Hence, the Supreme Court of Canada 
came up with the following: 
•Therefore, whatever is used on the scene of the 
crime must, in my view, be proven by the Crown 
as capable, either at the outset or through 
adaptation or assembly of being loaded, fired 
and thereby having the potential of causing 
serious bodily harm during the commission of tbe 
offence. or during the flight after the 
commission of that main offence. the hold-up• 
(in this case). 
The Court added that if ammunition is the only thing that is missing, the gun 
is a firearm. In other words, loading the gun is not an adaptation . 
* The Queen and Jl. Covin and The Queen and D. Covin, Volume 15, Page 8 
of this publication. 
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The accused, Watkins and Graber, relied on this Supreme Court of . Canada 
decision when they argued their case before the B.C. Court of Appeal. They, 
in essence, claimed that if they had used a revolver and all that was missing 
was the ammunition, the gun would have been a firearm and they would have no 
grounds for appealing this matter. However, they had a pistol._pnd it was not 
only the ammunition, but also the clip or magazine that was missing. 
Inserting this magazine empty into the gun would have functionalized the 
trigger mechanism, which was immobilized when they used the gun. Therefore, 
even if a single cartridge had been inserted in the pistol's chamber, without 
the magazine or clip, the gun could not have been fired and, consequently, it 
was incapable of causing the serious bodily harm as intended in s. 82(1) C.C. 
In as much as the C02 gun of the Covins was not a firearm because of any one 
of the seven missing essential parts, so was Watkins' and Graber's pistol not 
a firearm due to the one missing essential part--the ammunition clip. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal did not buy the apparent logic on the part of the 
appellants. Said the Court: 
•1t cannot be the intention of Parliament that a 
gun not be an operable firearm merely because 
its safety disconnector is engaged (which is the 
case when the clip is removed from the pistol). 
If the gun is complete . and capable of firing 
when loaded, then in my opinion, it should be 
considered a firearm under s. 82(1) of the 
Criminal Code.• 
(The underlined portion is not an emphasis but an explanatory comment by the 
author of this synopsis). 
The Court of Appeal expressed the view that neither Parliament nor the Supreme 
Court of Canada had intended the narrow meaning of firearm as the appellants 
suggested. After recognizing that the binding precedent established in the 
Covin decision relaxed the burden of proof on the Crown in that it need not 
establish possession of ammunition on the part of the perpetrators to show 
that they possessed a firearm, the B.C. Court of Appeal resolved the issue by 
holding: 
" 'ammunition' in this context should be read 
as including the paraphernalia by which the 
ammunition is loaded in the gun, in this case 
the magazine." 
The appellants had also been convicted of possessing a restricted weapon 
without the required permit. In view of the applicable portion of the 
definition of restricted weapon, the Crown had to prove that the Browning 
pistol was "designed... to be aimed and fired· by the action of one hand." 
Without the magazine the pistol could be fired by inserting anything into the 
- 10 -
cavity for the ammunition clip and depressing the safety disconnector, then 
one could fire off a single cartridge. It is very questionable if, even using 
two hands, one could manage to do this, argued defence counsel. He urged the 
court, therefore, to find that the pistol without the clip (the way the 
appellants possessed it) was not a restricted weapon. The JLC. Court of 
Appeal rejected this argument totally and said that what defence counsel was 
asking the Court to do was to substitute the words "designed t~'_with "capable 
of". This would not be interpreting the law but amending it, a function not 
within any Court's purview. 
Despite not winning any arguments in respect to the firearm issues, the Court 
found fault with the trial judge's consideration of the testimony by defence 
witnesses. A new trial was ordered. 
****** 
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THE CONDUCT OF PERSONS IR ADTHOllTY IS TO BE .JUDGED ON WHAT 
THEY OUGHT TO DAVE DOVlf Di RESPECT OF CHARTF.ll. llGHTS AT DIE 
TIME WEY ACT. SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Reg Ina v. Lacoy - B. C. Court of Appeal -
CA004884 Vancouver, September 1986 
Lacoy was under surveillance for importing cocaine. He arrived at the Sea-Tac 
airport in Washington and made his way by car to the Canadian border. Police 
alerted the Canadian Customs and when the accused attempted to enter Canada he 
was placed in an interview room and searched. Three lots of cocaine were 
found on his person. All of this happened on Kay 2nd, 1985. 
Although nothing in the answers to routine questions justified the search, the 
order was given to pull him in for further examination and a search. The 
search took place in an examination room. The inspectors who conducted the 
search had reasonable and probable grounds for doing so due to the information 
they received from the police. However, none of this was relayed to the 
accused, and nothing in terms of arrest, warnings and rights were given until 
the cocaine was found. 
At the time of this incident the legal precedents were quite clear; there was 
no detention in a situation like this until an arrest was made or such 
physical control was exercised over a person that detention is the only 
reasonable inference one could draw from the circumstances. Twenty-one days 
after this incident, the Supreme Court of Canada did shed a different light on 
this issue, in the infamous Therens* decision, and more recently, in the 
Collins** case. Detention received a less stringent definition and, in 
general, one is, for the purpose of the rights this triggers under the 
Charter, detained when being stopped by a person in authority and generally in 
a form of legal jeopardy that calls for or makes it in the person's interest 
to receive legal advice, whether or not he requests such consultation. 
The accused had requested, subsequent to his arrest, to contact his counsel. 
The customs inspectors told him to wait until police arrived and the police 
officers would not allow him to call \U\til a search of his home was under way. 
It was particularly the delay the police officers caused in the accused's 
access to counsel that caused the trial judge to exclude the cocaine from 
* R. v. Therens, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 and Volume 21, Page 1 of this 
publication 
** CollJns v. The Queen, Volume 27, Page 1 of this publication 
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being admitted into evidence. He totally rejected the Crown's submission 
that, due to the law being what it was on May 2nd, 1985, the police officers 
had acted in good faith. He was of the view that the police were agents of 
the State who had acted on a mistake of law. In as much as such a mistake on 
the part of the accused would not provide him with an excuse (a claim he was 
mistaken about the law re: bringing narcotics into Canada), it could not 
justify the actions of police if they were based on tb~ir erroneous 
perceptions of the law. Police are agents of the executive branch of 
government, the trial judge reasoned, and not independent of political 
authority. In other words, the issue is not one between the accused and 
independent officers, but clearly between the State and the accused. He 
identified the senior level of government in this case to be the Federal 
government, not because they had enacted the statute under which the accused 
was charged, but because they employ the R.C.K. Police personnel. 
The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal to the B.C. Court of Appeal, which 
clearly had resolved these issues in two cases recently decided by them.* The 
Court of Appeal gave a synopsis of what it decided, particularly in the 
Gladstone decision, as follows: 
"1 held that the conduct of the officers is to 
be judged in relation to what they know or ought 
to have known in respect of Charter rights at 
the time the search took place." 
The trial judge had "refused" to follow this binding decision, and he was 
erroneous in law when he rejected the "good faith" submission of the Crown. 
However, there were a number of other issues to be considered in this case, 
one of which is the Customs Officers complying with the Customs Act. Section 
143 stipulates that before a person is searched, he must be made aware that 
when he disputes the reason for it, he must be taken before a Chief Customs 
Officer or a Justice of the Peace to determine the reasonable cause for the 
search. 
Comment: 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
This case could well make history, if it reaches the Supreme Court of Canada, 
on the issue of good faith and, if some relevance is seen in this, the status 
of the police. The trial judge Americanized.the Canadian relationship between 
* R. v. Glads~one and R. v. Rodenbusb and Rodenbush, Volume 22, Page 
20 of this publication. 
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the executive branch of government and the office of constable - the surrogate 
citizen. Also, in this regard, the trial judge seemed to have failed to 
follow the common law. However, the status of police and the doctrine of the 
separation of powers in respect to their relationship with the executive 
branch of government may well be found irrelevant to the issues involved in 
this case. Though the officer is a free agent of his office and not an agent 
of the executive branch of government, he does join the interest of the State 
in its criminal dispute and hence its prosecutorial objectives whenever he 
investigates an apparent criminal incident. The trial judge had placed the 
constable much closer to the executive branch and we must hope that the unique 
position of the "constable" be maintained in Canada. Only ignorance of its 
legal historical development can erase this. 
****** 
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SEXUAL ASSAULT - HONEST BUT KISTAKEN BELIEF RE: CONSENT 
ADMISSIBILITY OF SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE 
The Queen and Robertson - Supreme Court of Canada -
June 1987 
The accused sexually assaulted one of two female roommates -who shared an 
apartment. He had, with violence, overcome the girl's objections and had 
sexual intercourse with her. He was a stranger to the complainant and had 
only learned a few days previous to the encounter from the complainant's 
roommate about the girl's living arrangements. He had a general conversation 
with the victim's roommate in a convenience store where she was a sales 
person, and had promptly asked her if she would go to bed with him . She had 
declined this generous offer. 
At trial, the accused conceded the assault including the intercourse, but 
claimed that he had a mistaken, though honest, belief that she had consented. 
This claim was not made by means of testimony on the part of the accused or 
defence witnesses, but by claiming that the inconsistencies in the 
complainant's testimony was sufficient for the jury to conclude that there was 
at least doubt about the issue of consent. The trial judge did not instruct 
the jury on the 'Papajohn' case* or on s. 244(4) c.c. (consent to sexual 
conduct) and the accused was convicted. 
The trial judge had also admitted into evidence the complainant's roommate's 
testimony that she had, just a few clays before, been propositioned by the 
accused . 
Claiming that the lack of instructions to the jury and the admission of the 
sexual proposition as "similar fact" evidence were legal flaws that entitled 
him to a reversal of the jury's verdict, the accused appealed and ended up in 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In regard to the issue of consent, the defence counsel argued that proof of 
the accused's knowledge that he had no consent was an essential ingredient (an 
element) of the offence and had to be proved by the Crown beyond a reasonable 
. doubt. In other words, the accused need not raise the issue and, if at the 
conclusion of the Crown's case there is no such proof, there is no case to be 
met. 
The Supreme Court of Canada hardly agreed with this defence theory. Firstly 
the Court held that s. 244(4) C.C. clearly shows that a "belief of consent on 
the part of the complainant of assaultn is a defence of m~stake of fact. 
* Papajohn v. The Queen. (1980] S.C.R. 120 
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On the question whether •knowledge of lack of consent• is one element of the 
offence or a defence of mistake of fact, the Court was unanimous: 
• .•. there must be evidence that gives an air of 
reality to the accused's argument that he 
believed the complainant was consenting before...;_.,,· 
the issue goes to the jury.... there are two 
separate burdens in relation to the issue of 
honest but mistaken belief - the evidentiary 
burden and the burden of persuasion. Evidence 
must be introduced that satisfies the judge that 
the issue should be put to the jury. Such 
evidence may be introduced by the Crown or by 
the defence. The accused bears the evidentiary 
burden only in the limited sense that, if there 
is nothing in the Crown's case to indicate that 
the accused honestly believed in the 
complainant's consent, then the accused will 
have to introduce evidence if he wishes the 
issue to reach the jury. Once the issue is put 
to the jury the Crown bears the risk of not 
being able to persuade the jury of the accused's 
guilt." 
The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated this theory when dealing with the 
Judge's obligation to put defenses to the jury. Before such obligation 
arises, there must be some evidence upon which the defence can be based. The 
trial must have revealed some evidentiary basis for the suggested defence. 
When a Judge is asked to put a specific defence to the jury, then, in the 
consideration to do so, he must not only consider whether there is evidence 
relevant to the defence but if the evidence relied on is true and sufficient. 
The defence of mistake of fact is merely a denial of ~ ~. In the case of 
sexual assault, an honest belief that there is consent removes the kernel 
element of the crime, that is the deliberate touching with the knowledge that 
·there is no consent. The lack of such knowledge then does not arise unless 
there is some evidence (crown or defence) to support it. In addition, where 
lack of knowledge is the result of recklessness (an indifference whether or 
not there is consent) that lack of knowledge cannot serve as a defence. Said 
the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985*, where effect was given by a trial judge 
to a claim of lack of knowledge that there was no consent: 
: 
* Sansregret v. The Queen, (1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 
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" the complainant consented out of fear and 
the appellant was wilfully blind to the existing 
circumstances, seeing only what he wished to 
see. Where the accused is deliberately ignorant 
as a result of blinding himself to reality the 
law, presumes knowledge ... " 
As it stands, since s. 244(4) C.C. has come into effect the jury must be 
instructed that the belief of the accused need not be based on reasonable and 
probable grounds, but ... 
" that, when considering all the evidence 
relating to the question of the honesty of the 
accused's asserted belief in consent, they must 
consider the presence or absence of reasonable 
grounds for that belief."* 
All this, of course, relates to the means to the end which is to determine if 
the accused had an honest belief that there was consent. However, when a jury 
finds, as a fact, that he did have such belief the requisite ingredient of 
criminal intent is negated and it must return a verdict of not guilty. The 
conclusion of honest belief, can result when it is not reasonable for the 
accused to have such belief.** 
In other words, the jury is entitled to consider the matter of reasonable 
grounds for the belief, but can find that there was such an honest but 
mistaken belief, despite the unreasonableness that lead the accused to this 
belief. 
The matter of reasonable grounds is simply part of the consideration and 
deliberation, or in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada**: 
"The reasonableness •.. of the accused's belief is 
only evidence for, or against, the view that the 
belief was actually held ..• " 
Addressing the apparent fear that this judicial law would lead to absurdities 
the Court said: 
* From Reasons for Judgement in Laybourne, Bubmer and Illingwort:h v. 
The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, 1986 
** Papajobn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 
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•rt will be a rare day when the jury is 
satisfied as to the existence of an unreasonable 
belief.• 
On this issue the Court concluded that the trial judge was, in view of the 
evidence before him, not in a position to put the defence of a mistaken, but 
honest belief, to the jury. 
The trial judge had allowed in evidence the accused's sexual proposition to 
the complainant's roommate. Defence counsel argued that this was evidence 
regarding a separate and unrelated incident that tends to show discreditable . 
conduct on past occasions, introduced solely to demonstrate the accused's bad 
disposition. The rules of evidence render such prejudicial evidence 
inadmissible unless it is so probative that it totally outweighs the prejudice 
it creates. Did this evidence assist to prove what was alleged against the 
accused? If the evidence was similar fact evidence, it is not admissible to 
prove propensities or inclinations on the part of the accused, or to allow an 
inference of • ... he did it before so he likely did it again ..• •, but only to 
show a consistency in the mode of operation. For instance, similar fact 
evidence has been admitted to show a system of operation, a plan on the part 
of the accused; a means to provide identity (this is the same person), or to 
rebut the defence of accident or mistake. lJhen these issues arise, similar 
fact evidence may be used to show that it was not likely a person other than 
the accused who committed the crime, or that what he did was not an innocent 
act in that he used the same strategy before. 
The question then is, that if the evidence of the sexual proposition is 
relevant (everyone agreed it was), is it admissible as similar fact evidence? 
In view of the explanation above, one of the first questions to be answered is 
if the sexual proposition to the roommate amounts to discreditable conduct. 
It most certainly was not a crime or connected to criminal conduct. The 
Supreme Court of Canada illustrated by means of an English case where the 
evidence of a non-criminal, but immoral or discreditable behaviour could be 
admissible. A Mr. Barrington had been charged with committing indecencies 
with young girls. To bolster the evidence, the Crown had called three young 
girls to the stand (not victims of the alleged indecencies), and had adduced 
.evidence how they had been approached by the accused for babysitting services 
but were instead shown pornographic pictures. He (Mr. Barrington) had not 
committed any crime or offence in relation to these witnesses, and they did 
not testify to any activities on the part of Barrington that amounted to an 
offence. Yet this evidence had been treated as similar fact evidence, because 
the demeanor and methodology in luring the young girls had been very similar 
to that of those that were allegedly victimized by acts of indecencies. 
Having determined that the accused's sexual proposition to the complainant's 
roommate could be admissible provided the probative value outweighs the 
prejudice, if any, the Court examined what the evidence could cause to be 
inferred or corroborate. 
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The evidence of the proposition would assist to establish the roommate's 
credibility; it showed possible motive and intent; the rebuffing of the 
accused could explain why he turned his attention on the complainant. These 
possibilities are somewhat remote and the evidence was found to have no great 
probative value. Secondly, was any prejudice against the accused caused by 
the sexual proposition? In comparison to Mr. Barrington's activities (showing 
pornographic pictures to young girls) the accused's request t~~be allowed to 
sleep with a woman approximately his own age is particularly, in contemporary 
socie:y, hardly a discreditable act. Though the evidence does cause 
prejudice, it was very little. In view of this balance, the Supreme Court of 
Canada concluded that the evidence had been admitted properly. 
Crown's• appeal from an order for a new 
trial was allowed. Accused's conviction 
upheld. 
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SCHOOL PRIRCIPAL SF.ARCllIRG STDDENT FOR DRUGS 
DOES CHARTER APPLY? IF SO. VAS SF.ARCH REASONABLE? 
Regina v. J.H.G. - Ontario Court of Appeal -
29 c.c.c. (3d) 455 
The school principal was told that a 14 year old grade 7 student had narcotics 
hidden in his socks. The principal and the vice-principal brought the youth 
to their office and informed him how they had come to suspect that he was in 
possession of drugs and he was asked to take off his socks and shoes. 
Marijuana cigarettes were found and, consequently, the youth was convicted of 
possession. There was apparently some interest in this case and the Civil 
Liberties Association became an intervenor in the appeal process. 
There appeared 11 ttle or no dispute over the procedure followed by the 
principal. The youth's father was present when the boy, after the search, 
made some inculpatory comment. No issue was taken with this part, but the 
appellant youth did argue that the Charter applied to the school system ~nd 
its personnel and that they (the principal and vice-principal) had violated 
his Charter right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. They 
simply did not have the requisite grounds for the search and, furthermore, it 
was not the principal' s function to enforce federal laws. He should have 
alerted police and let them handle the matter. 
Without addressing the issue in depth, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
the school and its personnel and management are subject to the Charter. (This 
made it unnecessary to decide if the Charter also applies to private 
individuals*). The principal had a discretion to call police, handle it 
himself or turn his information over to the parents. The offence was very 
serious in terms of school discipline; as far as a crime is concerned, it was 
not an offence of great magnitude. The principal exercised his discretion 
well in the circumstances. His actions were not only justified; they were 
dictated by his responsibility. The gro\lnds for the search were adequate and 
justified the "not excessively. intrusive search". For the good order and 
discipline in the school, it was reasonable to confront the student with the 
information and have him either prove or disprove the allegation. 
The next question was whether the youth had been detained and should have been 
informed of his right to counsel before he was searched. On the surface, one 
would be inclined to conclude that the youth's right to counsel had been 
violated. His movements were controlled; a demand was made of him that could 
have considerable legal consequences for him and he was impeded in having 
* See Regina v. Lerke, Volume 24, Page 44, and Volume 19, Page 12 
of this publication. 
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access to counsel. He was not even informed of this right. However, the 
Court found that there was no detention; what happened was all part and parcel 
of going to school. By the very nature of the school system, reasonable 
discipline and investigations into breaches of that discipline are part of 
attendance. 
The Court warned that there may be situations where a princip_~~. in deciding 
to handle an investigation, encounters circumstances whereby h~sfher actions 
make himjher an agent of the police. This applies particularly when the 
actions go beyond the performance of duty in maintaining order and discipline, 
as required in a school enviroronent. Bringing a student to an office for 
questioning and searching may well constitute detention, thereby causing a 
need for the Charter of Rights. 
Conviction was found to be proper. 
Note: 
It seems that the Supreme Court of Canada agrees with the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, as it denied leave for further appeal. 
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VHAT INTENT MUST THE CllOVR PROVE '1'0 SHOV CRIKINAL RF.GUGENCE 
-----IR THE OPF.RAUON OF A MOTOR VEHICLE? 
Regina v. Waite - 28 C.C.C. (3d) 326 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The church organized a picnic. Three tractors towing wagons with hay and 
peole were proceeding along a country road; it was dusk and right around the 
time headlights were required. The accused was part of the hay-ride group and 
had been following this small convoy in his car for some distance. Some of 
the young people had jumped off the hay wagons and were walking on the road 
side of the procession. The accused passed the wagons and drove some distance 
up ahead. He turned around and, at a high rate of speed with his fog lights 
on, he drove on the left side of the road heading straight for the lead 
tractor. He said to his passengers, •Let's see how close we can get.• At the 
last moment he crossed to his own side of the road knocking down five of the 
walking young hay-riders; four were killed and one was seriously injured. The 
accused had been drinking since that morning and his blood alcohol level was 
in excess of 80 mg. Immediately, after pulling over, the accused heaved a 
cooler of beer into the field. He was charged with four counts of criminal 
negligence causing death and one causing bodily harm. He was convicted of the 
included offence of dangerous driving; a verdict the Crown appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. 
It is reasonable to assume that the accused had no intentions to cause the 
tragic devastation that resulted from his •chicken• game. It was obvious that 
his manner of driving was advertent. Is that sufficient to prove the intent 
requisite to criminal negligence? Is the test to be applied an objective or 
subjective one? If it is subjective then the Crown most prove that the 
accused had a specific intent to drive the way he did, but was indifferent to 
the consequences. If the objective test is applied the Crown needs only to 
prove the manner of driving. In the absence of that being an involuntary act, 
it can then be assumed it was done heedfully, advertently, and with intent. 
The jury had asked for specific instructions on the distinction between 
dangerous driving and criminal negligent driving. The trial judge had 
responded that in dangerous driving the state of mind of the driver is not 
important. •You look objectively at the manner of driving. You just look at 
the manner of driving.• 
For criminal negligence the jury had been instructed to firstly look at the 
driving and if that was capable of criminal negligence •you also look at the 
subjective element•, at the mind of the driver. The manner of driving must 
have been deliberate and there must have been indifference to the consequences 
on the part of the driver. 
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The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with these instructions. It said: 
"Criminal negligence, like many criminal offenses, 
requires a finding of fault, including !!!.fill§. rea or a 
guilty mind of the accused. However. that guilty 
mind can be determined objectively from the actions 
or conduct of the accused." 
In other words, the requisite intent can be inferred from the advertence in 
regard to the manner of driving. 
Notes for the Curious 
Crown's Appeal allowed. 
New trial ordered. 
The reason for the judgement by the Ontario Court of Appeal are interesting 
for those who are curious about the historical development of criminal 
negligence. You can nearly detect a tone of facetiousness when the Court 
remarks that the law of criminal negligence was understood as well as the law 
of gravity until parliament in 1955 created the current definition of it. It 
seems implied that the parliament fixed something that wasn't broke, despite 
the fact that what was then put in statutory form was already established in 
common law. Furthermore, criminal negligence arose predominantly from the 
operation of a motor vehicle and often it was a case of motor manslaughter. 
The question continuously arose as to what degree of negligence was required 
to support a conviction. What did not assist in the confusion is that 
dangerous driving was removed from the Criminal Code for five years (1955-
1960). It created a vacuum that was more or less filled by criminal 
negligence and careless driving provisions in the provincial traffic statutes. 
In 1960, it had to find its place again while it seemed that we were still 
struggling to discover precisely what criminal negligence meant. (This theory 
re: the dangerous driving offence was not inferred from the judgement and is 
the author's view only). 
In 1892 the parliament of Canada created, in our first Criminal Code, an 
offence for the absence of care with anything under a person's control that 
could cause danger to life. Not taking reasonable care to avoid such danger 
constituted an offence. Fourteen years later the section was reworded and it 
became more clear that the lack of precaution and neglect were only punishable 
when bodily injury was the consequence of such neglect. 
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In 1921 the Supreme Court of Canada held that due to the wording and 
application of the section, there was not really any distinction between civil 
or common negligence and negligence punishable under criminal law. In other 
words, neglect that would give rise to civil responsibility was not distinct 
from that calling for a criminal penalty. 
This created judicial comments indicating strong disagreement with such 
equalization. In 1926, in dealing with this issue, the Ont-ario Court of 
Appeal clearly stated how this lack of distinction between civil and criminal 
neglect was inconsistent with the basic principles of law. After stating, in 
strong terms, that there cannot be a criminal liability unless the negligence 
amounts to a crime the Court said, quoting from a 1925 English case: 
"In the civil action, if it is proved that A 
fell short of the standard of reasonable care 
required by law, it matters not how far he fell 
short of that standard. The extent of his 
liability depends not on the degree of 
negligence. but on the amount of damage done, 
In a Criminal Court, on tbe contrary. the amount 
and degree of negligence are the determining 
guestion. There must be mens rea." 
(Emphasis added) 
In other words, in civil law, if common negligence is determined, which may 
have been inadvertent, the judgement turns not on the degree of neglect but on 
the consequence of it. In criminal law, the penalty must be consistent with, 
and deter the advertence re: wilfulness of the perpetrator rather than with 
the inadvertent consequences. 
In criminal negligence the test to determine the requisite intent became an 
objective one. That means that the CroWJi need not specifically prove that an 
accused intended to be negligent. Advertence may be inferred from the 
actions. If those actions showed a wanton and reckless disregard (an 
indifference as to the consequences of the advertent neglect) then it may be 
assumed that there was intent to be criminally negligent. This was simple and 
as understandable as the law of gravity. 
In 1955 our current definition of criminal negligence was inserted in our 
Criminal Code. It ought not to have c: .:nged things as it was a statutory 
reiteration of what already existed at common law. (Note that the current 
section 202 C.C. does not create an offence but simply -defines it so we may 
apply it to the specific offenses where criminal negligence is a kernel 
ingredient). From 1955 until 1960 nothing did change. Many courts of 
superior jurisdiction across Canada said, in essence, •There is nothing new 
under the sun" in response to the 1955 definition of criminal negligence. 
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In 1960 some innovative defence lawyer defended a person charged with careless 
driving under a provincial traffic law. He argued that the careless driving 
section was, ultra vi res, the provincial government as the parliament of 
Canada had occupied the very field of degree of neglect in the operation of a 
motor vehicle the provincial legislation intended to deter by its careless 
driving section. He submitted that the way criminal negligence was then 
interpreted by the Courts no longer made it distinct from care~ss driving. A 
dictum known as the "paramountcy doctrine" dictates that where both senior 
levels of government have powers to legislate, the federal enactments 
supersede the provincial ones rendering the latter, at least, inoperable where 
the two laws are occupying the same field with the same objectives. The 
Supreme Court of Canada ended up responding to this apparently valid argument. 
This august judicial body found that interpreting the two enactments, and 
considering the enabling constitutional provisions for the respective senior 
governments to legislate in this area (the fundamental assigned 
responsibilities of the federal and the provincial governments), there was a 
difference between criminal negligent driving and careless driving. "It is a 
difference in kind and not merely one of degree". At common law (the judicial 
application of law), there is no criminal liability "for harm caused by 
inadvertence" (an unintended act - heedlessness). Intent is a prerequisite ·to 
criminal liability. Mens llS!, (criminal mind) consists of two categories, 
intention ( subdividable in specific and general intent), and recklessness. 
"The difference between recklessness and negligence is the difference between 
advertence and inadvertence". Recklessness is not a degree of negligence. 
The former is a real crime particularly if harm results from it while 
negligence is not a moral epithet. The parliament of Canada had simply 
included in its criminal law a definition for offenses of advertent negligence 
if there are consequences, or if it is in the operation of some motor-powered 
means of transport. "Criminal negligence" is actually a misleading title and 
should be "advertent negligence". The provincial legislation deals with and 
may include "inadvertent" negligence in its offenses. Hence, the "advertent 
(criminal) negligence is distinct from the inadvertent (careless) negligence 
held the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In 1960, this case altered the requisite intent to convict for criminal 
negligent driving. For instance, advertence means an awareness, a subjective 
awareness, on the part of the accused. Consequently, it seemed that to 
·salvage the much needed provincial law a greater degree of negligence had to 
be proved for criminal negligence than before. At least the objective test to 
determine the intent by inference seemed out. 
This decision had caused considerable confusion and many courts differed in 
the application of that law. In 1972, the Supreme Court of Canada had the 
opportunity for another kick at the cat. Someone had deliberately used his 
car to injure a person. 'When tried for criminal negligent driving the trial 
judge had told the jury that they had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the accused had deliberately run down his victim and had thereby caused him 
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injuries. One Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada &;aid that subjective 
intent (having to prove actual intent, criminal state of mind) was too high an 
obligation on the Crown. The majority, however, maintained what that Court 
decided in 1960. 
In 1975 the Supreme Court of Canada heard an appeal related to a pilot charged 
with flying very low over a couple of men with the intent t~-l"righten them. 
The act was one of comradery rather than one of revenge. Nevertheless, he 
flew so low that he struck and killed one of them. In that case, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the conduct of the pilot, viewed objectively without 
anything further, is sufficient to show that he was criminally negligent. In 
other words, it seemed, on the one hand, that the objective test in respect to 
intent was restored. However, the alternative interpretation of the judgement 
is that the Crown was obliged to prove subjective intent to act recklessly on 
the part of the accused as a necessary ingredient of criminal negligence. 
What it comes down to is that the Supreme Court of Canada spoke out of both 
corners of its mouth. Even in the reasons authored by one Justice one can 
find support for either theory in deciding this "hay ride" disaster. The 
Court of Appeal of Ontario did find the support for objective testing for 
intent to be the strongest. Particularly the phrase in the majority judgement 
by the Supreme Court of Canada: "In most cases. the fact itself proves the 
intent" convinced the Ontario Court of Appeal to hold as it did. What 
appeared to comfort this Court of Appeal in its decision was that their 
counterparts in other provinces had continued to apply the objective test 
after the 1960 Supreme Court of Canada decision. 
Therefore, the Court held that the instructions to the jury that they had to 
test the intent in respect to the driving objectively and the intent to be 
reckless subjectively were erroneous. The trial judge should have read the 
definition of criminal negligence and instructed the jury to apply an 
objective test as to the intent for the driving which had to amount to a 
marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable driver. 
****** 
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VALIDITY OF INVESTIGATIVE AND RECOMMENDATORY COMMISSION 
INQUIRING INTO POLICE PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES 
Re: Robinson e~ al and The Queen - B.C. Supreme Court 
28 c.c.c. (3d) 489 
A prisoner was booked for being intoxicated in a public place. He complained 
to have sustained a serious knee injury due to treatment he received from 
police personnel. Not being satisfied with the decision of the police 
disciplinary authority that no proceedings would commence under the provincial 
Police Act, he requested a public inquiry by the police board, the employer of 
the officers who booked the complainant and were in charge of the jail at the 
time. 
This public inquiry simply failed to identify the officer(s) responsible for 
the injury to the complainant and, hence, no action could be taken against 
anyone. The police board, in its written reasons, were critical of: the 
procedures used to identify the parties responsible; record-keeping; the 
complainant's release while injured; there not being any explanation how the 
injury occurred; and that some of the officers had covered up events. They 
ordered the Chief Constable to review the matter or for the provincial Police 
Commission to do so. 
This caused the provincial Executive Council (the cabinet) to enact an order 
in Council appointing members of the Police Commission to be commissioners 
under the Public Inquiry Act to "inquire and report on all matters associated 
with the alleged injuries sustained ... • by the complainant; to do the same on 
the internal police investigation, the hearings under the Police Act and 
determine if truthful evidence was adduced at these hearings. The gist of the 
object of the inquiry by the Police Commission was to determine the above; as 
well as the time, place and by whom the injuries were inflicted. 
The officers on duty while the complainant was booked, detained and released, 
,petitioned the B.C. Supreme Court to quash the order in council as it was 
outside the jurisdiction of the provincial government. 
The arguments advanced are interesting. Our constitution divides the onus to 
govern between two senior levels of government. Each receives its legislative 
authority directly from the constitution. This means that their respective 
powers are original, which is the most fundamental -characteristic of a 
federation - a federal system of government. 
Our constitution gave jurisdiction to create criminal laws and all criminal 
procedures to the central or federal government . and the enforcement of those 
laws to the provinces (the administration of justice). The Courts have the 
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responsibility to determine if there is criminal or civil liability in any 
legal disputes. In this case, there is a complaint of a criminal assault, and 
the provincial government provided, by their order in council, a criminal 
procedure to attach criminal liability to someone. "This is outside the 
province's ambit", said the petitioners (the officers on duty in the jail at 
the time). Furthermore, the provincial government is attempting to short-
circuit the system they said. By appointing an investigative_J:_P.mmission with 
power to subpoena the right to remain silent is abridged. It is for police to 
investigate crime by legal means and sometimes with the assistance of judicial 
licence (warrants, etc.). This commission does investigate outside the police 
mandate. In other words, public inquiries are not designed to investigate 
matters of this kind. The commission's mandate usurps the function of the 
police and the Court, and applies the awesome powers of a public inquiry 
commissioner to criminal proceedings. 
Furthermore, the inquiry will cause double jeopardy for officers acquitted by 
the police board (s. 7 Charter), and their appearance before the commission 
will inevitably breach the right of protection against self-crimination. (s. 
13 Charter), submitted counsel for the petitioning police officers. 
As convincing as these arguments sound on the surface, they were all rejected 
by the Supreme Court Justice. In terms of the jurisdiction and legislative 
competence of the provincial government to enact the Order in Council, the 
Court held that it was intra vires that government. The Order in Council did 
not directly or indirectly legislate criminal procedure. Neither was the 
commission empowered to determine criminal or civil liabilities. The Province 
may create agencies that can inquire into the health of certain administrative 
areas for which it is responsible. That these agencies have power to subpoena 
witnesses and take evidence under oath from persons who may potentially be 
accused of an offence later is not new or improper so long as the matter 
inquired into is one of a valid provincial purpose. It is in the provincial 
ambit and interest that its law enforcement agencies operate properly in 
pursuit of their lawful objectives, free of corruption and criminal 
activities. If the inquiry is for recommendatory and not adjudicative 
purposes, the law enabling the inquiry does not go beyond the legislative 
competence of the province. The Justice said: 
,. a province can investigate the 
allegedly illegal or reprehensible 
behaviour of a police force within its 
constitutional jurisdiction, as well 
as the allegedly illegal actions of 
any peace officer.• 
None of the Charter and constitutional arguments, as explained above, have any 
validity as the commission: 
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has no judicial powers; 
cannot make any determinations as to liability or criminal guilt 
or innocence; and 
can only serve a subpoena on persons as witnesses to assist them in 
their recommendatory objectives as opposed to servi~-a summons on 
persons to answer allegations. 
Petition Dismissed. 
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IREA'tHALyzER TEST 
PROCRASTINATION - INERTIA - EXPERIMENTATION 
VIS-A-VIS •AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE• 
Regina v . Emslie - County Court of Yale -
Kamloops No. 1316 - April 1987 
The accused drew attention to himself by driving the wrong way up a one-way 
street. He procrastinated in giving a sample of his breath firstly for the 
Alert test and later for the breathalyzer. He wanted a glass of water, smoke 
his pipe, relieve himself, etc. He was as innovative in putting off the 
inevitable as a child is at bedtime. On the other side, the constable had 
recently completed an "Alert" course and conceded he made the Alert demand 
strictly to experiment with and practice the handling of the equipment. He 
candidly testified that he was sure of the accused's impairment, and that had 
he passed the Alert test, he would still have made a demand for breath samples 
for breathalyzer analyses. Between the two of them, some forty minutes had 
been wasted somewhat unnecessarily. If the word "practicable" in the Criminal 
Code means capability of doing something, one would be inclined to conclude 
that the breathalyzer test could have been done much earlier. However, the 
trial judge concluded that the delay had been mainly caused by the accused and 
some by the experimenting constable. The accused had given a sample of breath 
for the Alert test (after four attempts), but refused to give samples for the 
breathalyzer test. He was convicted of "refusing" and appealed that 
conviction. 
The accused's 
breathalyzer, 
practicable" . 
sample. 
argument was that when he was finally in front of the 
it was in terms of time well beyond the statutory "as soon as 
He therefore had a reasonable excuse to refuse to give a breath 
The law is that a peace officer is entitled to administer an Alert test 
despite the fact that he is of the opinion the suspect's ability to drive is 
impaired by alcohol, The delay that such a test causes will not effect the 
'as soon as practicable• requirement*, provided, of course, that it is 
administered with reasonable expediency. 
· The trial judge had found as a fact that the excessive delay had been caused 
by the accused. The officer had done what he was entitled to do and he had 
been prepared to take the breath samples the accused refused to give, within a 
reasonably prompt time, in the circumstances. 
Accused's Appeal Dismissed 
Conviction for 'refusing' Upheld 
* Regina v. Jensen, [1982) C.C.C. (3d) 11 
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ARRESTING A PER.SON FOR BEING DRUNK IN PUBLIC TO DISCUSS HIS 
IDENTITY AND UNK HIM TO THE AJWIDONED H & R CAR 
Regina v. Gilliland - County Court of Vancouver -
No. C.C. 861762 - May 1987 
---= 
A cadillac went through a red light on a main thoroughfare ·--and struck a 
vehicle proceeding on the green light. The cadillac failed to stop and also 
continued on its way when it crashed into an oncoming car shortly after. 
Police found a heavily damaged cadillac parked a few streets over, minutes 
after the accident. Approximately 10 minutes later they found the accused in 
an apparent intoxicated state, walking a few blocks from the car was found. 
It was near midnight and the man refused to answer any questions or identify 
himself. The officers arrested him for intoxication under the Liquor Laws and 
found, subsequently, that he was the owner of the damaged cadillac. He was 
then arrested for impaired driving and Hit and Run. He was convicted of 
refusing to blow and acquitted of impaired driving and hit and run. He 
appealed this conviction. 
Needless to say, everything hinged on the validity of the original arrest 
under the Liquor Control Act. It, for lack of a better term, got the ball 
rolling . Secondly, ownership of the cadillac is hardly reasonable and 
probable grounds for believing the accused drove it. Consequently, the demand 
for a breath sample was not lawful argued the defence. 
The trial judge had indicated some doubt about the humanitarian aspects of the 
original arrest (drunk in public). The officers had testified that they were 
concerned for the safety of the accused in that he was unable to look after 
himself. "I think he was arrested because they were looking for somebody who 
had possibly been involved in the accident at Fir and Broadway ... " concluded 
the trial judge. However, the motive for arrest was not his to judge he held, 
and concluded that the demand was lawful and that the accused failed to 
comply. The appeal court judge felt that this was an error on the trial 
judge· s part. It was for him to determine that the arrest was not an 
infringement of the accused's Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained. 
These defence arguments are valid and sustainable and, therefore, the appeal 
was allowed and a new trial ordered. 
The County Court Judge did not say that the arrest in the circ\.UDstances was 
improper or that the demand was not lawful. He only fpund that the trial 
judge had misdirected himself in saying that the validity of the original 
arrest was not for him to judge. 
. . 
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RIGHT TO PR.IVACY WHEN CONSULTING COUNSEL 
The Queen and Rusin - County Court of Vancouver -
CC 861850 Vancouver, May 1987 
The accused appealed his conviction of having refused to give samples of his 
breath consequent to a demand. One of the key issues in this--appeal was his 
right to counsel. 
The police officer had made the demand and immediately made the accused aware 
of his right to counsel. As soon as they arrived at the police station the 
accused was given access to a phone. 'When he had difficulty in reaching his 
lawyer the officer assisted him. The phone used was in a booth across the 
hall from the breathalyzer room. There was a door for the booth, but the 
accused did not close it. The officer conceded that he had been able to hear 
the accused's side of the conversation and the lawyer had recalled that he had 
heard the officer's voice in the background. After the call the accused 
refused and claimed that he had not been driving. 
The defence argued that: 
1. The accused was entitled to counsel privately whether or not privacy was 
requested; 
2. Consequently, the accused's constitutional right to counsel was 
infringed; and 
3. This infringement warrants the exclusion of the evidence of the refusal. 
To avoid this infringement the officer should have told the accused that he 
could close the door if he wanted to, or he should have closed the booth door 
himself. 
The Crown countered that the accused, by.leaving the door open, had waived his 
right to privacy. However, the · cases on this point say that a waiver must be 
"clear and unequivocal" and made "with full knowledge of the rights ... and of 
, the effect the waiver will have on those rights". As an example of this, see 
the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on the aspect of judicial 
fairness in respect to a waiver of a right.* It must be made not just with an 
operating mind, but also with awareness of consequences. In other words, you 
nearly have to be a sober lawyer to be able to waive a Charter right. 
It simply means that police officers cannot infer that detained persons have 
waived their right to counsel simply because they did not request that right. 
This, of course, includes the right to consult counsel in private. In this 
* R. v. Cla.rlcson, Volume 24, Page 38 of this publication 
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case, the officer could not infer a waiver regarding privacy simply because 
the accused left the door of the phone booth open. The B.C. Court of Appeal 
found that there was an infringement of the right to private consultation. 
As you can read in the Supreme Court of Canada decision (Therens)* on this 
point that the material facts that arise from and after the inf!.ingement are, 
in cases where a person is by law obliged to provide authorities with 
incriminating evidence, inadmissible in evidence. Due to that obligation, any 
infringement of a right will cause disrepute on the administration of justice. 
In other words, exclusion follows automatically in such cases. In Therens the 
breathalyzer readings were excluded and, argued defence counsel, in this case 
refusal must be excluded. 
The County Court Judge held that all the confusion the Therens' decision 
caused has now been settled in the very recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Collins.** It is not if the actions on the part of police could 
bring disrepute on the administration of justice, but whether the admission of 
evidence could. (Note: Not "would"). 
Applying this test,· the Court found that the refusal by the accused must be 
admitted into evidence. Furthermore, the accused should have shown on the 
balance of probabilities that the admission of the evidence could bring 
disrepute to the administration of justice. Also, the officer acted in good 
faith throughout. The accused would have to show that the quality of the 
advice he received was tempered by counsel's knowledge that the officers were 
nearby. Finally, there is no apparent connection between the lack of privacy 
and the refusal to comply with the demand for samples of breath. Afterall, 
section 24(2) Charter says that the evidence to be excluded must have been 
obtained "in a manner that infringed or denied any right". This does not call 
for "cause and effect• test, but means that there must be some reasonable 
relationship between the obtaining of the evidence and the infringement. 
Finally, the Court observed: •The appellant could easily have closed the door 
himself." That would have been a simple remedy to the •technical" 
infringement that occurred in th~s case. 
Accused's Appeal dismissed 
Conviction for refusal upheld. 
* R. v. Therens, Volume 21, Page 1 of this _publication 
'** R. v. Collins, Volume 27, Page 1 of this publication 
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RETURH OF SEIZED MONEY TO PERSON CHARGED 
Regina v. Grant - County Court of Kootenay -
Nelson C.C. 27/85 - January 1985. 
A large store's daily take was taken from the store's bookkeeper. 
Consequently, Mr. Grant was charged with robbery and was -a-t.quitted. He 
applied to this Court that the nearly $7000 police took from him upon his 
arrest would be returned to him. 
The police department, in whose jurisdiction the robbery took place, had 
requested a neighbouring force to go to Mr. Grant's home and arrest him for 
the robbery. 'When Grant was placed in the cells of this neighboring force he 
was told that police wanted the proceeds of the robbery. Grant used a phone 
and he and the officer went to a certain address where a woman turned over a 
brown paper bag containing $6765. 
The victim had no idea how much money was taken; there were problems . in 
regards to identity, and the Crown had not been able to get the money admitted 
in evidence. The statements the accused made during his encounter with the 
police, and when turning the money over to them were found to be involuntary 
and, hence, inadmissible. 
· In other words, the Crown had not .been able .to show that the monies were the 
proceeds of the robbery. Despite the Crown's submission that Mr. Grant should 
show the money was lawfully his, his application to have the funds returned to 
him was granted. The money was in Grant's possession and, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, that possession was lawful. 
****** 
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MEANING OF •FRAUD'" IN OBTAINING CONSENT FOR ASSAULT 
Regina v. Petrozzi - B.C. Court of Appeal • 
CA 005025 - May 1987 
The accused picked up a prostitute and promised to pay her $10~~!or two sexual 
services. At the time he made the offer he had no intentions of paying the 
$100. As a matter of fact he only had $10, and he did give that money to the 
girl. Things started to go a little off track in terms of the prostitute's 
consent. He, according to the complainant, became quite violent when she 
demanded the money in advance. He forced himself on her, had his sex and gave 
her $10. lJhen police happened on the scene the prostitute escaped from the 
accused and she complained to the officers. A charge of sexual assault 
resulted. 
The trial judge had instructed the jury that if they found that the accused 
had obtained consent by fraud then there was no consent. The accused appealed 
his conviction saying that this instruction was wrong and that fraud by which 
consent is obtained must be, as it was in the old rape section, a 
representation in respect to the quality or nature of the act, or regarding 
the identity of the perpetration. If what the accused did amounted to fraud, 
it was in respect to a business transaction. The question is whether the 
complainant's consent was vitiated by the accused's intention not to pay, and 
if s. 244(3)(c) C.C. now allows acceptance of a much broader meaning of fraud 
in respect to obtaining consent, then it used to be under the old rape 
section. The new section states that '"no consent is obtained where the 
complainant submits or does not resist by reason of fraud". 
The B.C. Court of Appeal was quite aware that it was open to them to consider 
anew the issue of fraud in regard to obtaining consent for assault. However, 
the old rape section was, in essence, a reiteration of the common law as it 
then was. Some theorists claim that if law is repealed it revives the common 
law. On the other hand, did parliament indicate that all falsehood and deceit 
will vitiate consent for assault? The fraud that used to negate consent was 
exclusively in regard to false representation as to the quality and nature of 
the act. For example, a therapist (no pun intended) may erroneously claim 
.that sexual intercourse would enhance the objectives of the treatment and then 
provide that therapy. Some of the most bizarre and far-fetched things have 
been told or claimed to obtain consent. There are old cases where men by 
impersonating a person (someone who would have the women's consent) obtained 
consent. The Courts held that the sexual intercourse did not amount to rape 
but assault. Parliament then included in the act consent by impersonation as 
something that would negate consent. Needless to say, impersonation, in these 
circumstances, is also fraud. Therefore, fraud in regards to consent has 
always been restricted to the quality and nature of the act and identity of 
the perpetrator. 
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Another Canadian case on this point was finally decided by the Supreme Court 
of Canada.* A patient had an appointment for a vaginal examination. Dr. 
Bolduc put a white coat on his musician friend Bird and introduced him as an 
intern. The patient consented to his presence, but would not have if she knew 
that Bird's interest in her vagina had nothing to do with the practice of 
medicine. Despite the fact that Bird did not touch the patient, both the 
doctor and the phoney intern were convicted of indecent assaul~~s the consent 
had been obtained by fraud . However, Dr. Buldoc did not misrepresent the 
quality or nature of the treatment (the assault), neither did he hide the 
identity of his partner. He simply lied as to the occupation of the 
spectator. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada quashed the convictions. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal concluded that although parliament did not include in 
its new section on consent for assault, the well established restrictions of 
fraud in obtaining consent, it did not mean to expand "fraud" as it is used in 
section 244(3) (c) to any act of falsehood that may have a causal connection 
with consent. Section 37 of the Interpretation Act makes this clear as it 
states that an amendment to law is not necessarily a declaration that the new 
law is different from the law as it was. Therefore, the word "fraud", in 
terms of obtaining consent for assault, is limited to the quality and nature 
of the act and in respect to the identity of the assailant. 
Conviction for sexual assault set aside. 
New trial ordered. 
* Buldac and Blrd v. The Queen 
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BEWARE OF ROtrrINE OR POLICY 'WHERE DISCRETION APPLIES 
ARBITRARY ARREST 
Law enforcement agencies may, by policy or suggested proced\n:'e, cause the 
"office holder" to routinely detain and arrest persons in certain 
circumstances while the law grants discretion to that officer to do so. 
Routine may also cause such detention without discretion. If lawful arrest is 
effected in compliance with policy or routine without any consideration to the 
purpose of the arrest then it could be argued that the arrest is arbitrary and 
an infringement of the constitutional right not to be arbitrarily detained 
(see s. 9 Charter) . The word "may" in s. 450 C. C. , where Parliament speaks 
directly to the peace officer, directs that discretion be used and that an 
arrest only be effected when necessary. Needless to say, statute supersedes 
policy or routine, and arrest without discretionary consideration as to its 
need may constitute arbitrary detention especially where there was no need to 
arrest. This is the new defence theory. Particularly where the offence -is 
indictable and one over which the Provincial Court has absolute jurisdiction, 
is hybrid, or one punishable on summary conviction the law is even more 
specific. It states that when an officer "may" arrest for any of these 
offenses he "shall" not do so unless any of certain aspects of public interest 
are not satisfied (see s. 450 (2) (d) C.C.). In the event an arrest has been 
effected where there were no grounds for believing that any of the public 
interest issues were not satisfied, then for all purposes in criminal law, the 
arrest is nontheless lawful and the officer in the lawful performance of duty. 
However, Section 450(3) (b) clearly indicates that this is not the case "in 
any other proceedings". 
Where arrests have been made, particularly for offences where the "shall not" 
applies, a novel defence strategy in criminal cases is now to argue that the 
detention was arbitrary. This opens ~he road to suppression of evidence 
and/or remedy under s. 24 of the Charter. Where an officer would give policy 
or routine as the reason for the otherwise lawful arrest, the defence 
objective to show arbitrariness is enhanced. There are several cases on this 
. Point now. It is too early to tell whether this new view will catch on. 
One case decided on this issue is Regina v. Labine (County Court of 
Westminster No. XO 17908, March 11, 1987), Labine was arrested according to 
policy and/or routine at the scene of an accident for impaired driving. Said 
the Court: 
"The police, by a policy which 
transcends the circumstances of the 
appellant and applies to all persons 
who have the misfortune to be 
suspected of impaired driving in one 
- 37 -
of the largest R.C.M.P. municipal 
Detachments in Canada, have taken it 
upon themselves, without authority, to 
arbitrarily abrogate the rights of the 
accused to be free of arrest without 
warrant in the absence of certain 
contingencies permitting them to do 
so, and to sustain such a policy would 
be to invite police officers to 
disregard the right of the accused to 
be free of arbitrary detention and to 
do so with an assurance of impunity.• 
Also, see R. v. Vare, R. v. Koper and R. v. Byers, County Court of Yale, 
C. C. 1309 - 1312 and 1313 respectively, and a Judgement by the County 
Court of Vancouver., No. C.C. 861833 in R. v. Pithart (Arrest of a 
Prostitute). 
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DEFENDING PROPERTY - ASSAULT 
Regina v. Blair - County Court of Vancouver -
Vancouver CC 860302, March 1987 
Mr. H and Mr. D attended at the accused's home to serve process on him 
regarding a mortgage foreclosure. The accused arrived home shortly after H 
and D had arrived, and caught H peeping in the windows. The accused requested 
these men to leave in language quite inconsistent with our etiquette or 
protocol for receiving guests. H and D readily agreed to comply with this not 
so gracious invitation to depart, and as they did, so did the accused. D 
decided he would get the accused's licence number while H would back their car 
out of the driveway. However, the accused drove his car in behind the one H 
intended to back out and alighted with a baseball bat in hand. He first 
encountered D (who by now should have had a clear view of the accused's 
licence plate) who he pushed and ordered to leave. D complied and started to 
walk up the street leaving his buddy H sitting behind the wheel of their 
blocked car in the accused's driveway. The accused stuck his head and the 
baseball bat through the open passenger window and swung the bat around while 
expressing the opinion that H did not adhere too well to his (the accused's) 
instructions regarding the process-servers' departure. With this, the accused 
removed his car and allowed H to leave and collect his buddy further down the 
road. 
The accused was convicted of two counts of assault while possessing a weapon. 
He appealed these convictions. 
The accused had relied on s. 41(1) C.C. which authorizes him to use as much 
force as is necessary to remove trespassers from his property. 
As the cases on this point go, the Crown was obliged to prove lack of lawful 
excuse on the part of the accused to use the force he did.* 
The accused had testified that he, on that day, was carrying a large a.mount of 
·money on him. He operates two car lots and was in the habit of carrying large 
amounts of money on him. Due to an unrelated incident, the accused had been 
threatened and he had been apprehensive about H and D prowling around his 
home. 
* See R. v. Taylor (1970] 73 W.W. R. 636 and Cole~ v. The Queen [1981] 
57 C.C.C. (2d) 105 or Volume 1, Page 18 of this publication. 
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The test under s. 41 C.C. is subjective and whether the force used was 
excessive. The trial judge had not applied these tests and the appeal court 
judge found that the accused was entitled to demand these men . ~o leave. The 
events after that request had not received the appropriate tests to determine 
intent and excessiveness. 
Appeal allowed 
Convictions set aside. 
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MUST AN INFORMATION UNDER THE YOUNG OFFENDERS A~ AU.EGE 
THAT THE PERSON CHARGED IS A •YOUNG PERSON• 
DOSANJH and The Queen - B.C. Supreme Court -
Vancouver CC 860851 - June 1986 
In this case, the information alleging that D had committed an offence failed 
to say that D was a nyoung person". 
D petitioned the Supreme Court to quash the information claiming that the 
Youth Court Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed as his or her jurisdiction is 
only over young persons. 
In 1985 the B.C. Court of Appeal* decided that the Crown need not prove the 
age of a "young person" as an element of the offence. The Crown submitted in 
this D case that if it is unnecessary to prove age then why allege it? 
Anything you include in an information you must prove. The Supreme Court held 
that these were two different issues. In the nR and C" case, the issue was 
whether age was an element of an offence under the Young Offenders Act as it 
used to be for a delinquency (only a juvenile could commit a delinquency). 
Here, the fact that the accused youth is a young person must be included in 
the body of the information held the Supreme Court Justice, not as a notice to 
the accused young person, but to give jurisdiction to the Youth Court Judge. 
Concluded the Justice: 
NOTE: 
"In the absence of an averment in the 
information that the person charged is a 'young 
person' under the Young Offenders Act, I have 
concluded that the Youth Court has no basis on 
which to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction." 
The words used to designate the form used for informations under the Young 
.Offenders Act, do not assist in this matter. 
* Regina v. R. and c .. CA 002902, November 6, 1985 
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GOOD FAITif 
Regina v. HOSIE - County Court of Vancouver • 
No. CC 861299, December 1986 
A traffic officer pulled over a speeder. He discovered that the occupant of 
the car was sought by the drug squad, and he ensured that two members of that 
squad arrived at the scene. One of these officers asked if they could search 
the car, but this was refused. This officer then thought he saw the butt of a 
marijuana cigarette (a roach) in the open ash tray. Upon request, the ash-
tray was pulled out and handed to the officer who was of the opinion that the 
cigarette end was marijuana. He arrested the accused and searched the car and 
the accused. Nothing was found, but the accused threw something into an 
adjacent field. This turned out to be a quantity of hashish. At his trial 
for possession of a narcotic, the roach was not tendered in evidence and the 
trial judge did not believe the officer had spotted the roach by simply 
looking into the car. This, of course,:affected the reasonable and probable 
grounds for the arrest and search. The officer had not acted in good faith, 
but neither could it be said there was bad faith. Holding that the defence 
had not satisfied its onus of proof to show prerequisite grounds for exclusion 
of the evidence, all the exhibits were admitted and the accused was convicted. 
He appealed. 
For a court to find that an officer acted in good faith, there must be an 
evidentiary basis for doing so if there is an absence of evidence of good 
faith. As explained before*, if it has been shown that there was a breach of 
a Charter right then the burden to show good faith shifts to the Crown. In 
this case, as in Therens, the Crown failed to do so. The trial judge had not 
applied this test. He had left the matter right in the middle and admitted 
the evidence. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
* See Therens and Gladstone Cases, Volume 18 and 22 respectively 
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Comment: 
Some Courts have suggested that, if the officer who encountered Mr. Therens in 
a drinking/driving situation had testified that his failure to treat Therens 
as a detained person after a demand for a breath sample was made~ was based on 
his awareness of the pre-Charter definition of detention created by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Chromick case, the officer may have been found 
to have acted in good faith. They instead held he had "flagrantly" infringed 
Theren's right to counsel. 
****** 
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SEARCH AND SEIZQRE 
Regina v. Parsons - B.C. Supreme Court -
Vernon 15732, April 1987 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A man wearing a balaclava shot two men coming out of a pub ~~m across the 
street. All this occurred around midnight in the dark. A police car assigned 
to another district moved to the area in which the shooting took place to 
assist the officer who was dispatched to the scene. He found that a shotgun 
was used and obtained a description of the culprit. The police patrol, moving 
in to assist, spotted the accused walking. The fact that he paid absolutely 
no attention to the police vehicle (like a deliberate attempt not to be 
suspicious), the description of the suspect generally fitting that given by 
the officer at the scene, and that his direction of travel coincided with that 
in which the culprit had left the scene, the officer decided to check the 
pedestrian. Even when he pulled up behind the accused, he did not look back 
or do anything to discover who was stopping behind him. When asked, the 
accused turned around and came to the officer and gave his name. A large 
bulge was noticed under his clothing -and when asked what caused it, ·he 
answered "a shotgun.". Upon this response, the accused was treated in such a 
way that he was "detained". A search of his person resulted in finding all 
the parts of a shotgun and ammunition. A balaclava and a knife were also 
found on him. This resulted in an arrest. The Charter right to counsel, and 
the standard right to remain silent warnings were given. 
The _accused was charged with six criminal offenses including two counts of 
attempted murder. 
Defence counsel did his level best to have the facts of the shotgun, 
ammunition and balaclava suppressed. He argued that the search was conducted 
on a hunch and suspicion; therefore, the search was without any reasonable 
grounds, and hence, unreasonable. Furthermore, the •right to counsel" 
information should have been given before the search. 
Responded the Supreme Court Justice: 
"In this case, I hold that the particular 
situation required the officer to do what 
he did in the way he did. He did not 
search or lay a hand on the accused until 
after he had seen the bulge, asked what 
caused it, and was told that it was a 
shotgun. Under these circumstances,. I do 
not hold, as the defence would have me 
hold, that the regular officer should have 
taken no further steps until he had given 
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the Charter rights' warning. That theorization 
runs contrary, in my view, to common sense and 
to reasonable and proper law enforcement ... " 
The words 'without delay•, as applied to the 
context of this situation, do not mean 
immediately or instantaneously, and under 
prevailing circumstances. I find no viola.tion 
under s. lO(b) of the Charter." 
The Justice found that everything found on the accused and what he said at the 
time ("A shotgun" - "Anything I have to say will be said by my lawyer") was 
admissible in evidence. 
****** 
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CRIMINAL JAW AND CONSTRUCTIVE :KNOWLEDGE 
Regina v. TEWARI - B.C. Court of Appeal -
Vancouver CA 003366, June 1987 
The accused arrived at the Vancouver airport on a flight from-B~mbay via Hong 
Kong. Thirteen million dollars worth (street value) of heroin was found in 
the walls of his suitcase. 
At his trial the accused testified that he owed a person a considerable amount 
of money, and to repay he was to take a suitcase to Vancouver. If he refused, 
hiswife and children •would suffer•. The accused conceded he knew that he was 
carrying contraband, but he had no idea what. He had guessed that it was gold 
or currency. 
Generally, the doctrine of •constructive knowledge• (you may not have known 
specifically what you were in possession of, but in the circumstances you 
ought to have known) has no application in criminal law unless specifically 
provided for. \lhere knowledge is a requisite ingredient to an offence the 
Crown must prove specific knowledge or adduce evidence from which the 
irresistible inference of knowledge can be drawn . 
The trial judge had told the jury that when the accused accepted the suitcase 
and knew that there was something wrong about the content, he, for criminal 
purposes, accepted •the whole thing•. He went on to say that if the accused 
honestly believed he was carrying gold or currency, and that the possibility 
that he was carrying heroin had never dawned on him, they were to acquit the 
accused. 
The law generally is that where a person knows he is smuggling something into 
Canada and he is indifferent or is wilfully blind as to what it is, then he is 
criminally liable for whatever he possesses and imports. In this case, the 
jury had to find that the· accused never believed he was carrying a narcotic or 
had a reasonable doubt about his knowledge to acquit. They convicted the 
accused and he appealed. 
·The B.C. Court of Appeal found no fault with what the jury had been instructed 
to consider. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
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CREATING A DISTlJJlBANCE IN A PUBLIC PIACE •FIGHTING• 
Regina v. niller - County Court of Kootenay -
Nelson No. 230332, April 1987 
Fighting, like ballroom dancing, requires at least two willing partners. In 
either activity, any unwilling person involved is a victim rather than an 
offender. 
In this case, police found two persons, the accused and another man, fighting 
on a public street. There was no evidence on how it started or whether one 
party was simply defending himself from the other's aggression. It seems, 
from the reasons for judgement that the trail judge found that there was a 
public disturbance, but the Crown failed to show that the accused caused it, 
despite the fact that he was one of the two men who appeared engaged in a 
fight. Due to the lack of evidence that he initiated, consented to, or was 
even indifferent in respect to the scene police encountered, the accused was 
acquitted and the Crown appealed. 
The defence argued that the Crown not only failed to prove the requisite 
intent (mens rea), but also the wrongful act (actus reus). When a person is 
caught in circumstances as the accused was, there are many explanations 
possible that would render the person innocent of any offence. The accused 
owed no explanation at the time or at his trial. The burden of proof was 
exclusively on the Crown and they failed to meet that burden. All the police 
could say was that there appeared to be a fight and the accused was in it, 
which is not sufficient to prove the alleged offence of creating a 
disturbance. 
The County Court Judge (Appeal Court) agreed. 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
upheld. 
Acquittal 
- 47 -
MEANING OF COMMITI'ING GROSS INDECENCY VITH OTHERS 
Regina v. SHEPHERDSON - County Court of Vancouver Island -
Nanaimo Registry 3559, March 1987 · 
The accused, a 74 year old man, had shown pornographic movies-b> six children 
(3 boys and 3 girls) ranging in age from nine to thirteen years. During the 
showing the accused had made comments on the anatomy of the women in the 
movies and had masturbated in full view of the children. Consequently, he was 
charged with having committed an act of gross indecency with those children 
despite the fact that there had been no bodily contact or the ~lightest 
attempt or encouragement for such contact. The children had attended 
voluntarily upon invitation. 
The Criminal Code only prohibits (s. 157 C.C.) an act of gross indecency if 
it is with another person. The subsequent section gives the well' known 
exemptions to the offence, one of which is consent. It is obvious· that 
nothing in the section applies to the circumstance as they were in this case. 
The cases decided by Courts of Appeal are not consistent. The Manitoba Court 
of Appeal decided that s. 157 C.C. denotes that ~nother person must 
participate in the Act. A man had masturbated in front.of another adult who 
was a mere bystander. An acquittal was ordered.* 
In the B.C. case, the Court of Appeal decided subsequently on the invo1vement 
of another person. In diat case, a man had placed his penis near the mouth of 
a four year old girl. Semen bad been found on the girl's dress. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal concluded from this: 
" ... she was not only in the presence of the 
accused, but it is a reasonable inference she was 
near the accused at the time the masturbation 
occurred .•. " 
" •.. the action of masturbation by the accused 
was directed at this child. That, it seems to 
me, involved her with him in his commission of 
the offence and hinges the case within s. 
157.•tt 
* R. v. Debattista, (1986] 2 Y.Y.R. 722 
** R. v. Huntingdon, June 1986, B.C. Court of Appeal - Unreported 
a 
' 
•' 
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The word "with" also means being in the company or presence of another person. 
However, the Courts seem to agree that that is too broad a meaning for that 
word as it is used in s. 15 7 C. C. However, the word •with• also means 
•towards, in the direction of or near or close to, alongside or against•. It 
had, therefore, been found in 1982* that a man who had unzipped the sleeping 
bag of an 11 year old female guest who was sleeping on h~~- tummy on his 
sundeck, had done up her nighty so the buttocks were exposed and had 
masturbated semen on the girl's legs (all while the girl was asleep), had 
committed an act of gross indecency with that girl. 
In all the cases where there was masturbation in the presence of others, it 
had to be directed at those other persons to support a conviction of gross 
indecency. In this case (Shepherdson), the masturbation was only in the 
presence of the six children, and to say that this would be doing it "with" 
these children would be too liberal an interpretation of s. 157. 
Accused was •reluctantly" found to be not 
guilty. 
* R. v. •G•, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 24 - Queen's Bench decision. 
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OBLIGATION TO ANSWER - K!SUNDERSTANDlNG CR.OSS-£XAMINAT10N QUESTIONS 
The accused stood trial for sexual assault. The evidence revealed that the 
complainant had voluntarily shared a motel room for the 'ftf.ght with the 
accused. Consequently, the complainant claimed sexual assault and consent 
became the kernel issue. Defence counsel, who had failed to share his defence 
strategy with his client, saw an opportunity to use the evidence that French-
kissing had been part of the foreplay to support the defence of consent. The 
accused testified, and in the examination chief Defence Counsel had his client 
confirm that there had been French-kissing. The prosecutor tried to establish 
that the French-kissing was all the accused's idea and had no bearing on the 
issue of consent. The cross -examination went as follows: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
JUDGE: 
Q: 
A: 
•lJho started the French-kissing?• 
•1 don't know.• 
•1 remind you that you are· under oath and I ask 
you again, who started the French-kissing?• 
•1 don't know.• 
•1 must instruct you to answer the question. 
The law compels you answer the question 
truthfully and to the best of your knowledge.• 
•Having heard the instruction you just received, 
I ·ask you again, who started the French-
kissing?• 
•1 honestly don't know for sure sir, but was it 
perhaps Maria Antoinette or Napoleon?• 
****** 
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POLICE BEHAVIOUR CAUSE FOR REASONABLE EXCUSE TO REFlJSE 
GIVING SAMPLES OF BRF.ATH UPON DEMAND AND/OR CAUSIRG DmURGEMERT 
OF A RIGHT GUARANTEED BY S. 7 OF THE CHARTER 
Regina v. SHOBE - County Court of Prince Rupert -
Terrace No. 85580, April 1987 
When police behaviour makes it reasonable for a person to believe that there 
is malice and that unfairness will result, that person may well have a 
reasonable excuse to refuse giving samples of breath upon demand. However, if 
there is even outrageous actions on the part of police, which would justify a 
citizen's complaint, it does not follow that there is a •reasonable excuse to 
refuse• unless there is a connection between that behaviour and the belief of 
malice and unfairness. 
In this case, there was evidence that the accused had been physically 
mistreated by the officer on the scene. The officers, who dealt with the 
accused at the station, were different members. There was no evidence that 
there was any link between the treatment at the scene and that by the officer 
who operated the breathalyzer. The two scenes were removed from one another 
in time, and in terms of personnel. This was the opinion of the trial judge 
and the appeal court judge came to the same conclusion when the accused 
appealed his conviction for refusing to give samples of breath. 
At trial, defence counsel had submitted that the accused's rights to life and 
liberty of the person had been infringed. The trial judge had not made a 
finding in regard to this issue. The physical force applied on the accused 
could range from a justified force necessary to carry out a duty to brutal 
assault. It simply was not dealt with. 
Should the latter be true, one would have to concede that no evidence was 
obtained from it, thus exclusion or suppression of evidence as a remedy is 
impossible. However, it should have been determined if a right had been 
infringed and a remedy should be invoked under s. 24(1) of the Charter. 
Appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
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SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE AS A REMEDY TO CHARTER. 
llIGHTS VIOIATIONS - PROCEDURE 
Regi.n.9. v. Clauson - 31 C.C.C. (3d) 286 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused, charged with •over 80 mlg• requested the trial judge to conduct a 
voir-dire on the admissibility of breath-test evidence. The trial judge 
refused as all prerequisites to the admissibility of that evidence seemed in 
order. Upon appeal by the accused arising from his conviction, it was learned 
that the object of the request for the voir dire was to suppress the evidence 
of the analyses, as he alleged that one of his Charter rights had been 
inf ringed. A new trial was ordered and the Crown appealed that order to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal. It observed that all doubt that existed at the time 
of trial about the procedure defence counsel suggested has since been cleared 
up by the Supreme Court of Canada.* 
The enforcement provisions created by s. 24(2) of the Charter are not defenses 
but simply stipulate that denial of a Charter right may lead to suppression of 
evidence thereby obtained. Such determination •is a necessary incident of the 
trial process•. The accused must make clear and particularize which right was 
infringed and then the trier of the law (the judge) must, in . the absence of 
.· ~ the jury,· hear the issue and determine the remedy.- This procedure is not part 
of the main trial. The Supreme Court of Canada had suggested the pre-trial 
motions are also permissible and have •administrative advantage•. 
The trial judge's denial to conduct such a •hearing• (voi r dire may be a 
misleading term, held the Alberta Court of Appeal), rendered the trial 
incomplete. 
Crown's Appeal Dismissed 
New Trial Ordered 
* «ills v. The Queen, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481 
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CARE AND CONTR.QL 
Regina v. Bremner - County Court of Yale -
No. 15166 Vernon - May 1987 
The accused, after having consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, mounted 
his car and drove for a distance before realizing that he had drunk too much 
to be driving. He then •abandoned his intention of driving• and parked on the 
side of the road and went to sleep behind the wheel. Approximately two hours 
later a police officer finds the accused and, consequently, he was convicted 
of having care and control with a blood/alcohol content in excess of .80 mlg. 
The accused appealed the conviction. The Appeal Court (the County Court of 
Yale) agreed with the accused that due to him having abandoned his intentions 
to drive and there being no evidence that he did anything that involved some 
use of the car's fittings that caused a risk of putting it in motion, there 
was no care and control. 
Appeal Allowed 
Acquittal Ordered 
Comment: Based on the decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1983* and 
1985**• it seems that the conclusion reached by the Appeal Court Judge may be 
inconsistent with these binding precedents. In the Ford case the Supreme 
Court emphasized that the definition of •care and control• in s. 237 C.C. is 
not exhaustive. In other words, there are other means by which care and 
control may be found. Furthermore, held the highest Court, the section had 
not been enacted to import an intention to drive as a requisite to •care and 
control•. Ford also sat behind the wheel of his car without any intention to 
drive. A physical position which creates the danger of unintentionally 
causing the vehicle to move does suffice to show care and control held the 
court. In the Toews' case the Supreme Court reiterated what they held in the 
Ford case. Toews had not occupied the driver's seat, however, and was in a 
sleeping bag well away from the fittings of the car. The vehicle was, in 
essence, a bedroom without any actions of the accused or his position making 
accidental motion of the vehicle a likely possibility. 
* Ford v. The Queen, Volume 11, Page 29 of ·this publication. 
** R. v. Toews. Volume 22, Page 24 of this publication. 
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•CR.O'WN PROVING ALTERNATIVE HF.ANS BY VHICH A MURDER VAS COMMITrED• 
Thatcher v. The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada -
December 1986 
The accused and his ex-wife went through a venomous divorce dispute. The ex-
wife was beaten and shot, and consequently died. The accused was charged with 
murder. The Crown adduced evidence to support that either the accused 
committed the murder himself or he had someone do the killing for him. The 
trial judge went over the evidence in his address to the jury and he observed 
that the Crown's evidence was consistent with either version of the accused's 
involvement in the murder. He instructed the jury that if they found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused had either committed the murder himself 2[ 
had aided and abetted the murderer, either mode is equally culpable. The 
jury, despite the defence of alibi, did convict the accused and he appealed, 
eventually to the Supreme Court of Canada. One of his grounds for appeal was 
that he should have been charged specifically with one of the means by which a 
person can be a party to the offence alleged as stipulated in s. 21 C.C. The 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown was not obliged to specify in the 
indictment which of the statutory means it was relying on to show the accused 
committed murder. It proved, beyond a doubt, that . the accused was a party to 
the offence of murder by two alternative theories, either of which made the 
accused a party to the offence. 
Conviction Upheld 
~: Similar rulings exist where the definition of an offence creates 
various means in which the offence can be committed. Theft is a prime example 
· of this. (see s. 283 C.C.). Where a person is charged with theft the Crown 
need not specify which means included in the definition it relies on. If, at 
the end of the day, it proves one, and now it may well be alternative means by 
which an accused enriched himself from someone elses property, he can be 
convicted. Each means creates a culpable offence. 
• I 
